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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO EXECUTIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AUTHORITY
Narenji v. Civiletti
617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980)
Throughout the crisis' in the relations between the United States
and Iran,2 attention was focused on the fate of the Americans held cap-
tive in Iran 3 as well as the implications of the situation in regard to
strategic United States foreign policy objectives.4 While these consid-
erations may indeed have represented the most significant aspects of
the crisis, important domestic legal issues arose as well.5 Narenji v.
Civileti6 is the most obvious example of these potentially complex
1. Technically, the term "crisis" may not be appropriate when referring to the recent conflict
between the United States and Iran. The elements of a crisis are an unexpected situation in which
fundamental values of at least one protagonist are threatened and in which there is a perceived
need for immediate action. While the time element may have existed at the inception of the
conflict, the "wait-and-see" attitude adopted by the United States belied the existence of a crisis.
Nevertheless, "crisis" became a term of common usage to describe the situation. See NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 10, 1980, at 57.
2. Relations between the United States and Iran worsened when the government of Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi was overthrown in January, 1979. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, at I,
col. 6. Relations further deteriorated upon the resignation of Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar on
February 11, 1979, leaving political power in Iran squarely with the Islamic clerics, most notably
the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 6. A crisis devel-
oped on November 4, 1979, when the United States embassy was overrun and American citizens
taken captive. E.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at I, col. 6.
3. Initially, sixty Americans were taken captive. On November 18, 1979, the Iranians hold-
ing the embassy released blacks and women in the embassy, voicing support for Americans op-
pressed in the United States. E.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 6. The release reduced the
number of hostages to fifty-three. Subsequently, United States Councilor-Officer Richard Queen
was released because of deteriorating health. E.g., Chicago Tribune, July I1, 1980, at I, col. 6.
The remaining fifty-two hostages were released on January 20, 1981. E.g., Chicago Tribune, Jan.
21, 1981, at I.
4. The loss of Iran as an ally of the United States represents serious strategic problems for
American foreign policy. First, not only is Iran lost as a major exporter of oil to the United States,
but its strategic position on the Persian Gulf and bordering the narrow Straits of Hormuz threat-
ens the total supply ofoil exported from the Middle East. E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1979, at 3, col.
1. Second, there is the fear that the Iranian revolution will inspire a wave of Islamic fundamental-
ism which will breed hostility toward the West in many Middle Eastern countries. Id Finally,
the difficulty had by the United States in resolving the conflict may undercut American credibility
in dealing with countries other than Iran. The conflict may have fostered the perception that
American military power is inadequate and American diplomatic influence is ineffectual.
5. Legal issues other than those discussed in this comment include: the actions by President
Carter in freezing Iranian assets in the United States, the right of local officials to limit Iranians'
rights to assemble and voice grievances and the right of President Carter to stage a military rescue
operation without consulting Congress.
6. This case was consolidated with Confederation of Iranian Students v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d
745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
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questions of law.
In Narenji, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld an executive regulation 7 which required all
Iranians living in the United States on student visas to report to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and to prove current student
status. Despite the rather precipitate manner in which the District of
Columbia Circuit adjudicated the case,8 Narenji presents complex is-
sues of constitutional law. These issues include the constitutional rights
afforded aliens in the United States,9 the separation of powers in the
federal government' ° and the implied or inherent powers of the Presi-
dent in the conduct of foreign policy." These issues provide the focus
for this comment.
The comment will analyze the constitutionality of the executive
regulation at issue in Narenji.'2 The analysis considers the question of
whether the regulation is valid or whether it is an unconstitutional
abridgement of the rights of Iranian nationals in the United States;
whether the promulgation of the regulation is within the authority of
the Attorney General; and, finally, whether the ready deference to the
Executive exhibited by the court of appeals was justified.
The comment posits that, although the regulation is discriminatory
against a class of aliens, such discrimination does not in itself render
the regulation invalid. According to equal protection analysis, the fed-
eral government may classify aliens in virtually any manner it desires. '3
Nevertheless, the governmental authority to promulgate such a regula-
tion may not lie within the power of the Executive but, rather, may be
an exclusively congressional function. Furthermore, if the executive
branch is justified in promulgating the regulation, its authority must be
based on the expanded authority of the President in foreign policy.'
4
Finally, the comment criticizes the court of appeals for its seemingly
unconditional deference to the Executive. While the Executive may
have the requisite authority to promulgate the regulation because of the
obvious foreign policy implications in this particular situation,' 5 the
District of Columbia Circuit improperly implies that the Executive
7. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
8. The text of the court's opinion is a scant two and one-half pages with only limited author-
ity brought to bear.
9. See text and accompanying notes 57-107 infra.
10. See text and accompanying notes 108-48 infra.
11. See text and accompanying notes 127-48 infra.
12. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
13. See text and accompanying notes 86-107 infra.
14. See text and accompanying notes 143-48 infra.
15. See text and accompanying notes 198-203 infra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
may practice such discrimination in any situation.16
NARENJI V CIVILETTI
Facts of the Case
In response to the complicity of the Iranian government 17 in the
takeover of the United States Embassy and the capture and detention
of American citizens therein, President Carter directed the Attorney
General to "identify any Iranian students in the United States who
[were] not in compliance with the terms of their entry visas and to take
the necessary steps to commence deportation proceedings against those
who have violated applicable immigration laws and regulations."'
8
Pursuant to presidential directive and under the authority granted to
the Attorney General under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952,19 Attorney General Civiletti issued a regulation 20 requiring all
Iranian nonimmigrant post-secondary students to report to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service by December 14, 1979 with evi-
dence of their resident and student status. 21 The regulation specified
that failure to comply with its provisions would subject each student
not in compliance to immediate deportation proceedings. 22 The re-
quired notice and comment proceedings of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 23 were waived in the announcement of the regulation as being
impractical and contrary to the public interest,24 presumably because
the international crisis made speed essential in the implementation of
the regulation.
16. See text accompanying notes 203-09 infra.
17. Actually the de jure government of Iran disclaimed responsibility for the attack on the
embassy and offered help to the United States in effecting the return of the embassy and the
hostages. However, the civilian government of Mehdi Bazargan was unable to fulfill its commit-
ment, and Mr. Bazargan resigned two days after the takeover on November 6, 1979. The de facto
regime of Khomeini supported the initial seizure of the embassy as well as the continued detention
of the Americans in Iran.
18. 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2107 (Nov. 10, 1979).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976). This section grants the Attorney General the authority to pro-
mulgate regulations to administer and enforce all laws relating to immigration and naturalization:
The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this
chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens ...
He shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and
other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary
for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter ...
20. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
21. 1d.
22. Id
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). The Act provides for public notice of proposed rule changes and
the opportunity for public comment and hearings.
24. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (D.D.C. 1979).
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Reasoning of the Trial Court
As a result of Mr. Civiletti's actions, Mr. Narenji, an Iranian, and
the Iranian Student Association 25 brought suit against the government
alleging that the Attorney General failed to comply with the notice re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act; that statutory authori-
zation for the regulation was lacking; and, that the classification
contained in the regulation was unconstitutional. 26 The trial court re-
jected the nonconstitutional challenges, holding that, assuming the reg-
ulation to be valid, any delay in its promulgation and date of
compliance would weaken any effect it could have on the international
situation. Therefore, the court held that the notice and comment re-
quirements were rendered impractical and were contrary to the public
interest. 27 The district court also found that the promulgation of a reg-
ulation requiring aliens to report to the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service was within that statutory authority granted to the Attorney
General which allows him to ensure the ouster of all nonimmigrant
aliens who are "out of status.11
28
Nevertheless, despite the determination by the trial court validat-
ing the waiver of notice requirement and the general statutory author-
ity of the Attorney General, the court held that the regulation was
invalid.29 The district court based its holding on the limited authority
of the Attorney General to regulate aliens and the equal protection
rights afforded aliens under the fifth amendment. 30 The court reasoned
that the congressional delegation of authority to the Attorney General
did not include the authority to classify aliens by national origin.
31 It
found that the classification of aliens by national origin must be sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny. 32 In employing the strict judicial scru-
tiny test, the district court held that the government had failed to show
an overriding national interest to justify the regulation. 33 The court
reasoned that the goals upon which the government based its regula-
tion had only a tenuous cause-and-effect relationship to the discrimina-
25. See note 6 supra.
26. 481 F. Supp. at 1134.
27. Id at 1137.
28. Id at 1138.
29. Id at 1146.
30. Technically, the fifth amendment does not have an equal protection clause. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the due process clause of the fifth amendment as necessarily
incorporating equal protection comparable to that applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. E.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
31. 481 F. Supp. at 1141.
32. Id at 1139. See note 50 infra.
33. 481 F. Supp. at 1145.
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tory regulation itself.34
Reasoning of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court, finding the
regulation not to be violative of constitutional equal protection and its
promulgation to be within the authority delegated by Congress to the
Attorney General. 35 The court reasoned that, although there was no
specific grant of authority to the Attorney General to establish distinc-
tions based on nationality, the general grant was broad enough to allow
any distinctions and classifications which are "reasonably related to du-
ties imposed upon him." 36 The court found that such a relationship did
exist.
37
The court then considered the trial court holding that the classifi-
cation of aliens by national origin was unconstitutional. The District of
Columbia Circuit held that, in the area of immigration, classifications
based on national origin are permissible 38 unless such distinctions are
"wholly irrational. ' 39 The court thus employed the minimum rational-
ity test, in contrast to the strict scrutiny test utilized by the district court,
and held that the government clearly had met its limited burden of
proof.4°
The court rejected the determination by the lower court that the
government had not established a legitimate national interest to justify
the discriminatory classification. The court of appeals indicated that
the district court, in holding that no adequate national interest existed,
had overstepped the bounds of the proper role of the judiciary.4 I The
District of Columbia Circuit emphasized the political nature of the ex-
ecutive decision, which allowed only a limited examination of the ac-
tions of the executive branch. 42  The court reasoned that the
promulgation of regulation 214.5 constituted a clear action of foreign
34. Id at 1144. The government posited that the presence of the Iranian students in the
United States could provoke violence, thereby confounding the President's attempts to reach a
negotiated settlement of the dispute with Iran. The district court reasoned that because the gov-
ernment had not been able to show that the Iranian students would themselves provoke or insti-
gate trouble, the discriminatory regulation was not justified. Id




39. Id See note 80 infra.
40. 617 F.2d at 748.
41. Id
42. Id See also notes 111-26 infra and accompanying text.
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policy and, therefore, represented a political issue over which the judi-
ciary should decline review.
43
In his concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon added "additional
support for the court's ruling."' 44 He reasoned that the regulation was
merely one aspect of the American diplomatic effort 45 to alleviate the
international crisis and therefore was more readily justified. Further-
more, Judge MacKinnon stressed that the regulation merely provided
for the expulsion of any Iranian alien who had violated his or her visa
status.4 6 He concluded that because all aliens out of status were subject
to the same penalty, te., deportation, the regulation did not represent
discrimination against Iranians because of their national origin.
47
While the district and appellate courts differed in emphasis in their
analyses and differed markedly in their holdings, both courts recog-
nized that the central issue in Narenji is whether the executive branch
has the authority to promulgate a regulation directed at a class of aliens
because of national origin. The determination of the validity of such a
regulation invokes analysis of the equal protection of aliens afforded
under the Constitution, especially regarding nationality-based regula-
tions and the extent of executive authority to regulate aliens, either
through inherent constitutional authority or through congressional del-
egation. It is these issues which this comment will now address.
ALIENAGE, NATIONAL ORIGIN AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Narenji involves a regulation based on two separate classifica-
tions-alienage and national origin. The national origin classification
is clear on the face of the regulation, because the regulation only ap-
plies to persons of Iranian nationality.48 Also, the alienage classifica-
43. 617 F.2d at 748.
44. Id. at 749 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
45. Id Judge MacKinnon mentioned the presidential order restricting the importation of
Iranian oil, the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States and the moving of substantial naval
forces into the Persian Gulf region.
46. Id. at 750 (MacKinnon, J., responding to petition for rehearing).
47. Id Judge MacKinnon seems to miss the point that the respondents did not claim that the
government has no right to deport Iranians out of status but, rather, disputed the right of the
Attorney General to classify aliens based on national origin.
The District of Columbia Circuit denied a petition for a rehearing en banc in a five-to-four
decision. Id. at 750. The judges voting for granting the rehearing, Judges Wright, Robinson,
Wald and Mikva, argued that the issues in the case deserved more searching judicial attention.
After the decision of the court of appeals, the plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari as well as a
petition for a stay of execution pending disposition of the writ. The Supreme Court denied the
petition to stay the enforcement of the judgment of the court of appeals, 445 U.S. 948 (1980), and
later denied the writ of certiorari. 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
48. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
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tion is obvious because the regulation only applies to noncitizens in the
United States.
49
The Supreme Court has been firm in its determination that classifi-
cations based on national origin are inherently suspect and will be sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny.50 This doctrine was first enunciated in
Korematsu v. United States.5 1 In Korematsu, the Court adjudicated a
wartime regulation requiring the exclusion of persons of Japanese de-
scent from a military area on the West Coast.52 While the Court up-
held the scheme, it did so only because the Court found that the
regulation was required for national security.53 The Court made clear
that it would not tolerate nationality-based regulations absent the type
of national emergency produced by the war.
54
Since the Korematsu decision, the courts apply strict scrutiny
55
whenever nationality-based discrimination has been established.
56
Therefore, if the regulation at issue in Narenji were construed to be
simply a national origin regulation, a court would necessarily demand
the showing of a compelling governmental interest supporting the regu-
lation. However, simple nationality-based discrimination analysis
seems inappropriate in addressing the issues in Narenji because the
plaintiffs in Narenji were not Americans, but Iranian nationals. Na-
tionality-based discrimination refers to discrimination against United
49. Id.
50. The courts view "suspect classifications" with great disfavor. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The
criteria for determining a suspect class are imprecise, but various factors have been deemed to be
relevant: immutability of characteristics of a class, highly visible characteristics of the class, his-
torical disadvantages of the class and a relative lack of political representation of the class. See,
e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524-26 (1978).
Courts will employ strict judicial scrutiny where a suspect classification is shown or where a
classification has infringed on a fundamental constitutional right. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate
travel). The courts will countenance such a classification only upon a two part showing. Initially,
the governmental authorities must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest for the legisla-
tion, regulation or policy in question. After showing a compelling state interest, a state must show
that the legislation, regulation or policy in question is necessary and the least restrictive means of
achieving the state purpose. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973). To date, state actions discriminating against aliens have not survived strict
judicial scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 71-85 infra.
51. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
52. Id at 216-17.
53. The Court found that the government reasonably feared a Japanese attack of the West
Coast and that the government could not effectively apply restrictions to disloyal Japanese Ameri-
cans alone. Id. at 218-19.
54. id at 219.
55. See note 50 supra.
56. Whenever discrimination against a suspect class has been established, strict scrutiny is
applied. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (strict scrutiny applied to classification
based on race).
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States citizens based on their national origin. Therefore, it is appropri-
ate to outline the rights afforded aliens under the Constitution and to
discuss the validity of a nationality-based classification among aliens
within that framework.
The Supreme Court has been determining the constitutional rights
of aliens in the United States for nearly a century. 57 Nevertheless, the
precise nature and scope of the protections afforded aliens remain un-
certain. Certainly aliens are afforded many basic constitutional protec-
tions embodied in the first,58 fourth,59 fifth60 and sixth 6' amendments.
At the same time, however, discrimination against 62 and classification
among63 aliens have been constitutionally sustained while similar regu-
lations concerning citizens have not.64
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court held that aliens are sheltered
under the aegis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,65 the Court invalidated a regulation
66
which, through its application, 67 discriminated against Chinese aliens
as well as United States citizens of Chinese descent. 68 The Court held
that a discriminatory state regulation could not stand absent a "special
public interest" 69 which the regulation was designed to protect.
57. The first case involving the rights of aliens in the United States appears to be Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
58. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
59. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
60. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (proscription against depriva-
tion of liberty without due process); Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (193 1) (proscrip-
tion against taking of property without due process).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
62. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), where the Court upheld a state restriction
prohibiting aliens from employment with the state police force.
63. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (classification based on illegitimacy and sex);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (classification based on political affiliation).
64. Compare Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) and Fiallo v. Bell, 430 US. 787 (1977). See
also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976); Rosberg, The Protection of4liensfrom Discrimina-
tory Treatment by the Federal Government, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 275, 277 [hereinafter referred to as
Rosberg].
65. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
66. The regulation prescribed the kind of building in which laundries could do business, and
required all owners to obtain permits before doing business. Over 200 persons of Chinese descent
were denied permits while 80 similarly situated Caucasians were granted permits. Id at 374.
67. The regulation was facially nondiscriminatory because it did not specifically draw a dis-
tinction based on alienage or national origin.
68. The Court held that the discriminatory application of the statute effectively eliminated
Chinese individuals from the laundry business, while protecting Caucasian owners. 118 U.S. at
373.
69. The precise definition of special public interest is uncertain, as is its distinction from
compelling state interest. See note 50 supra. The special public interest test appears to represent a
more lenient standard than does the compelling state interest test, but a stricter standard than the
rational basis test. See note 80 infra. A special public interest may refer to a subject which is an
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In spite of the pronouncement in Yick Wo that aliens in the
United States are entitled to constitutional protection, the extent of that
protection was unspecified for decades. Although, like Yick Wo, most
of the early alienage cases dealt with state regulations affecting alien
employment, the Court vacillated in its application of the Yick Wo
doctrine and of the equal protection clause as applied to aliens, failing
to establish a clear line of precedent.
70
In 1971, however, the Court, in Graham v. Richardson,7' declared
alienage to be a suspect classification.72 In Graham, the Court invali-
dated a state welfare scheme which denied benefits to aliens. 73 By es-
tablishing alienage as a suspect classification, the Court mandated strict
scrutiny when adjudicating the validity of state regulations which dis-
criminated against aliens. Under the standard of strict scrutiny, a state
must show a compelling state interest before discrimination may be jus-
tified.7
4
After Graham, it was much more difficult for states to justify dis-
criminatory regulations aimed at aliens. 75 However, despite the Gra-
ham directive to employ strict judicial scrutiny when examining
regulations discriminatory against aliens, as well as the general unwill-
ingness of the Court to countenance discriminatory regulations, the
Court has recently upheld regulations discriminatory on their face ap-
parently without finding it necessary to apply strict scrutiny. In Foley v.
important concern to governmental authorities, but which need not be of a "compelling" nature.
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (classification based on sex accorded an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny).
70. While in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court invalidated a statute which lim-
ited the percentage of aliens that could be hired by private businesses employing more than five
individuals, that same year in Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), the Court upheld the exclu-
sion of aliens from employment in public works. The Court also held that the protection of na-
tional resources was a legitimate special public interest, allowing restrictions on hunting by aliens
in Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). However, the Court later retreated from that
position in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), in which the Court invali-
dated a state restriction on aliens in the commercial fishing industry.
71. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
72. See note 50 supra.
73. 403 U.S. at 374.
74. Id at 376. See note 50 supra.
75. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. I, 12 (1977) (Court invalidated state restriction
permitting financial aid only for citizens, aliens who had applied for citizenship or aliens who had
submitted statement of intent to apply for citizenship); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605-06 (1976) (Court invalidated regulation restricting
aliens in the practice of engineering); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (Court invalidated
Connecticut regulation barring aliens from the practice of law); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 642-43 (1973) (Court invalidated New York statute banning aliens from all civil service posi-
tions). See also Maltz, The Burger Court and Alien Classificaions, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 671, 677
(1978).
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Connelie,76 the Court upheld a New York statute barring aliens from
employment in the New York state police. 7 7 The Court held that strict
judicial scrutiny is not required when dealing with matters firmly
within constitutional prerogatives of the state. 78  Finding state police
officers to be "important nonelective executive, legislative, judicial...
officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or re-
view of broad public policy,' 79 the Court held that employment of state
police constitutes a matter of state prerogative and, therefore, the Court
required only a showing of a rational basis80 for the discriminatory reg-
ulation in order for the ban to be upheld. The Court found such a basis
in the supposedly greater affinity of citizens for American traditions-a
presumably valuable asset in the execution of official police duties.8 '
Similarly, in Ambach v. Norwick,8 2 the Supreme Court upheld a
New York education law which restricted employment as public school
teachers to citizens or to aliens who had manifested their intent to be-
come citizens. Once again, the Court found public teaching to be a
"governmental function" and, therefore, required that the state need
show only a rational basis to justify its discrimination against a class of
aliens. 83 The Court found this particular discriminatory restriction to
be rationally based.
8 4
The right of a state to discriminate against aliens has not been de-
lineated precisely by the courts.85 The Supreme Court appears to be
willing to accept state discrimination against aliens only in regard to
essential state employment. However, it has shown considerably more
tolerance toward federal regulations. While the Court, in Hampton v.
76. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
77. Id at 296.
78. Id. at 296.
79. Id
80. When a court applies the rational basis test, the governmental authorities need to demon-
strate only that the regulation at issue has a rationally-based relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The rational basis
test is the most lenient standard of judicial review. A court will utilize the rational basis test when
it determines that the governmental action in question neither violates a fundamental right nor
establishes a suspect classification. Under the rational basis test, the courts will presume the valid-
ity of the regulation, and it will be upheld as long as the court can discern a rational relationship
between the action and a legitimate state interest. Cf. note 50 supra.
81. 435 U.S. at 299-300.
82. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
83. Id at 80.
84. Id. at 80-81.
85. In general, courts will employ the strict scrutiny test in adjudicating a regulation discrimi-
natory against a suspect class, and no state has yet been able to meet this test. Alternatively, the
Supreme Court will employ only a rational basis test in adjudicating discrimination in areas of
important public employment and has always been able to find a rational basis to uphold discrim-
ination in these cases. See text and accompanying notes 75-84 supra.
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Mow Sun Wong8 6 invalidated a Civil Service Commission prohibition
denying aliens eligibility in the federal civil service,8 7 many other dis-
criminatory federal regulations have been sustained.
88
For example, in Mathews v. Diaz,8 9 the Supreme Court upheld a
government regulation which restricted Medicare benefits to citizens
and to aliens who had established residency in the United States for at
least five years. 90 The Supreme Court has also accepted certain con-
gressional classifications of aliens based on political affiliation. In
Kleindienst v. Mandel,91 the Court upheld the restriction of entry into
the United States by members of the Communist Party absent specific
permission from the Secretary of State.92 In Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy,93 the Court upheld a statute declaring alien membership in
groups advocating the overthrow of the United States government to be
a deportable offense.
94
Finally, in Fiallo v. Bell,95 the Supreme Court validated a statutory
immigration classification based on legitimacy and sex. The statute in
question allowed alien family members of naturalized citizens to enter
the United States without complying with statutory quotas.96 The con-
troversy arose because the scheme offered the familial benefit to natu-
ral97 maternal relationships, but denied these benefits to natural
paternal relationships. For example, a citizen in the United States
could bring her illegitimate child into the country as an immigrant and,
thus, avoid any statutory quota. However, a similary-situated father
could not confer this benefit on his illegitimate child. In upholding this
statutory scheme, the Supreme Court emphasized the plenary power of
the federal government over aliens in the United States. 98 Because of
this predominant federal power over aliens, the Court utilized the ra-
tional basis test in determining the validity of the scheme. 99 The Court
found a legitimate interest in the convenient administration of immi-
86. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
87. Id at 116-17.
88. See notes 89-107 infra and accompanying text; Rosberg, supra note 64, at 277.
89. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
90. Id at 80.
91. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
92. Id at 770.
93. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
94. Id. at 591.
95. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
96. Id at 799-800.
97. The term "natural child" means an illegitimate child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 303
(4th ed. 1968).
98. 430 U.S. at 796.
99. Id at 795. See note 80 supra.
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gration policy and the forestalling of fraudulent claims of paternity.100
Fallo points out the extremely limited standard of review which
the Court has employed in evaluating federal discrimination against
aliens. The Court has largely deferred to the political branches of gov-
ernment concerning the treatment of aliens because of its determina-
tion that the issues are largely political in nature.' 0,
The Court has made this determination because of the implica-
tions of the treatment of aliens on the foreign relations of the United
States, 0 2 as well as the basic sovereign right of a government to control
its borders. 10 3 Because of these political overtones, the Court has gen-
erally limited itself to a narrow standard of review, i e., the rational
basis test. Therefore, unlike the states, the federal government need not
show a compelling interest to justify discrimination against a class of
aliens. Federal regulations must be supported only by a legitimate in-
terest.
Addressing the issue of the validity of a nationality-based classifi-
cation of aliens, state regulations would almost certainly be declared
unconstitutional while federal regulations would probably be sus-
tained. The Supreme Court has indicated that it would not tolerate
state actions purporting to regulate aliens legitimately, but which, in
reality, discriminate against a particular racial or national group. I At
the same time, while the Supreme Court has never adjudicated a case
apposite to Narenji, the Court has upheld the right of the federal gov-
ernment to classify by national origin 0 5 in the field of immigration. 06
In sum, the Supreme Court has employed a considerably different
standard when reviewing state discrimination, at least when state gov-
ernmental employment is not involved, than when evaluating federal
discrimination. Because of the Court's determination that federal gov-
ernmental power over aliens is plenary, and that the question of the
100. 430 U.S. at 798-99.
101. Id See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972).
102. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
103. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
104. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
105. Congress limited immigration by national origin in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 22
Stat. 58. In 1924, Congress established the national origin quota system, 43 Stat. 153. As of 1965,
the Congress abandoned the use of race, national origin, sex, place of birth or place of residence to
determine eligibility of an alien to immigrate. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1976) (certain exceptions are
enumerated).
106. See, e.g., Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); United States v. Bhagat Singh
Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (commonly
known as The Chinese Exclusion Cases).
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treatment of aliens is predominantly political, federal discrimination
over aliens has almost always been sustained.'
0 7
Despite the implication that under the limited standard of judicial
review the federal government can lawfully establish virtually any re-
striction over aliens, some issues in Narenji remain unresolved. Simply
because the federal goverment may have the requisite constitutional
authority to classify aliens by nationality does not necessarily mean
that the Attorney General may so regulate. Therefore, it is appropriate
to analyze the authority of the executive branch of government as it
applies to the issues in Narenji. Furthermore, because the District of
Columbia Circuit applied a minimal standard of review of the execu-
tive action, citing the political nature of its decision, it is also appropri-
ate to analyze the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate cases
with political overtones and the circumstances under which courts will
limit their examination of political questions.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Power of the Courts
The power of the judicial branch of government essentially is lim-
ited through jurisdiction and deference. Article III of the Constitution
grants the federal judiciary jurisdiction only over existing cases or con-
troversies which involve federal questions or residents of different
states. 0 8 Therefore, the federal courts cannot adjudicate matters which
are exclusively of state concern nor cases in which a legal controversy
does not actually exist or when the controversy has become effectively
settled. 10 9 These restrictions serve to limit the power of the federal
bench by prohibiting independent formulation of policy or establish-
107. See Rosberg, supra note 64, at 277. Related to the argument posited by Rosberg that the
difference in the standard of reviewing state and federal regulations stems from the presumption
of the Supreme Court of the political nature of the treatment of aliens, is the theory that federal
action has preempted the treatment of aliens. The preemption theory posits that federal legisla-
tion in immigration preempts state regulation of aliens because state actions may confound the
purpose of the federal legislation. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 897 (10th ed. 1979); Note, The Treatment of Aliens." Preemption or Equal Protection,
31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979).
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This section sets out the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
sul;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between
a State and Citizens of another State;-[and] between Citizens of different States.
109. The Court will only adjudicate cases which are ripe, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952), and which have not become moot, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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ment of rules of law. Constitutionally, these restrictions are designed to
ensure that the federal courts do not become quasi-legislative bodies,
fashioning solutions to problems which may not be legal in nature.
Other than these constitutional jurisdictional limitations on federal
courts, such jurisdiction can and has been limited even further by Con-
gress. 10
Aside from the constitutional and statutory limitations on jurisdic-
tion, prudential restraints have developed as well. Under what has
been referred to as the political question doctrine,"' courts have re-
stricted their own powers by declining to consider issues which they
construe to be political in nature. While the basis of the political ques-
tion doctrine is the constitutional mandate of separation of powers," 1
2
the application of the doctrine is largely discretionary," 1 3 with courts
deferring to the executive and legislative branches of government on
issues which the courts deem to be beyond their competence. There-
fore, when approaching an issue to which the political question doc-
trine may be applicable, courts do not ask whether they can exercise
jurisdiction, but whether they will assume jurisdiction and adjudicate
the issue.
A comparison between two leading cases addressing the political
question doctrine--Colegrove v. Green " 4 and Baker v. Carr ' 5-reveals
the distinction. In Colegrove, the Supreme Court refused to grant relief
for alleged discriminatory apportionment of congressional districts. In
a plurality decision, the plurality stated that the "appellants ask of this
Court what is beyond its competence to grant." 16 The plurality found
that the express grant to Congress to deal with the apportionment of
congressional districts precluded judicial intervention."t 7 The Court in
Baker departed from the reasoning in Colegrove by deciding that legis-
lative apportionment was a justiciable issue. The Baker Court noted
that "[t]he doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions' not
of 'political cases.' The courts cannot reject as 'no lawsuit' a bona fide
controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
110. The Constitution allows Congress to limit the number of federal courts, U.S. CONST. art.
Ill, § 1, as well as their jurisdiction, Id. § 2. See also Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506
(1868).
111. See note 118 infra.
112. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554-56 (1946).
113. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (1978).
114. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
115. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
116. 328 U.S. at 552.
117. Id at 554-56.
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constitutional authority." '"l 8 While Baker did not expressly overrule
Colegro ve, 19 Baker certainly replaced the earlier case as the definitive
statement on the political question doctrine.
20
The Court in Baker applied its version of the political question
doctrine to a case involving political actions of a state. 12 1 Later the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Baker doctrine and extended the identi-
cal criteria in adjudicating political actions by the federal government
in Powell v. McCormack. 122 In Powell, the Court accepted jurisdiction
over Adam Clayton Powell's challenge of his expulsion from Con-
gress.' 23 The Court invalidated the expulsion, examining closely the
actions of Congress, despite the constitutional provision which provides
Congress with the authority to control its membership. 24 The Court,
therefore, adjudicated a case, even though a criterion of the political
question doctrine, tie., "a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a political branch" was established.
125
Therefore, while the political question doctrine is based on the
presumption of constitutional separation of powers, it must, at least in
application, be viewed as a doctrine of self-imposed judicial deference.
The political question doctrine must be considered predominantly dis-
cretionary in nature, with the courts able to assume jurisdiction in vir-
118. The Court in Baker set out the elements of the political question doctrine:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing [the issue]; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioned adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
369 U.S. at 217. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969).
119. While the holdings in Baker and Colegrove are contradictory, the Baker Court did not
expressly overrule Colegrove. Apparently the Baker Court found that action unnecessary because
it determined that Colegrove did not hold that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 369
U.S. at 202. The Baker Court considered the redefinition of the political question doctrine to be
sufficient.
120. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969), where the Court quotes the lan-
guage of Baker on the definition of the political question doctrine. See also note 119 supra.
121. In both Colegrove and Baker the Court was dealing with the actions of local authorities
in apportioning congressional districts.
122. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
123. The House of Representatives voted to exclude Congressman Powell for his alleged use
of his office for his own enrichment. 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 5038-39 (1967).
124. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5. Section 5 provides:
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members. . . . Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.
125. 395 U.S. at 549. See also note 118 supra.
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tually any controversy regardless of the political nature of the dispute
or political overtones of adjudication.'
26
Power of the Executive
There exists a mandatory separation of powers between the legis-
lative and executive branches of government. Although there have
been recent stirrings of controversy regarding possible congressional in-
trusion into executive prerogative, 27 the precise demarcation of the au-
thority of the President has generated even greater confusion. This
confusion appears to stem from the vagueness of the express powers
granted to the Executive by the Constitution, in contrast to the more
precise authority granted to Congress. 28 This disparity has led to the
implication of presidential powers inherent in the role of the Chief Ex-
ecutive and the concept of sovereignty.
In Myers v. United States,'29 the Supreme Court upheld President
Hoover's removal of a postmaster from office. In so holding, the Court
accepted a broad view of executive authority, concluding that the Presi-
dent, unlike Congress, could exercise authority drawn from sources not
enumerated in the Constitution, as long as the authority exercised had
not been specifically forbidden. 30 In spite of this pronouncement that
the Executive may exert nonenumerated authority, the extent of the
implied powers of the Executive remains extremely unclear.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 13 1 the leading case on the
implied powers of the President, epitomizes the confusion in this area
of the law. In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court prevented Presi-
126. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Court adjudicating a dispute be-
tween the political branches concerning the withholding of recording of presidential conversa-
tions); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Court reviewing and
adjudicating claim of the government that the publication of certain documents would constitute a
serious threat to the national security); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (Court review-
ing congressional action in expelling one of its members).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), where the judicial branch forced
President Nixon to release recordings despite the President's assertion of executive privilege. See
also The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976), which limits the authority of the
Executive to commit United States military forces without congressional approval.
128. The constitutional grant of power to Congress states that "[aill legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (emphasis added). However,
the grant to the President provides that "Itlhe executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § I (emphasis added). The distinction of these
grants has been interpreted to provide inherent executive powers in the President. See 7 J. HAM-
ILTON, WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (N.Y. 1851).
129. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
130. Id at 118.
131. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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dent Truman's seizure of steel mills during the Korean War. 132 The
plurality concluded that the President did not have the authority to ef-
fectuate the seizure reasoning that the taking of private property for
public use was not an executive function, but one which belongs to the
legislature. 133 The plurality found no delegation of this eminent do-
main authority to the Executive and found significance in the fact that
Congress debated the grant of authority, but decided not to include
such a delegation in its legislation.
134
However, the lack of executive authority to seize the steel mills
was the only finding in which a majority of the Court could concur.
The decision of the Court, which in effect, was accepted only by its
author, 135 seems to limit the implied powers of the President. However,
it also appears that a majority of the Court did, in fact, adhere to the
inherent powers theory, 136 with three Justices asserting that such pow-
ers would permit the attempted seizure.
137
Basically, Youngstown appears to stand for the proposition that,
absent effective delegation, the Chief Executive cannot assume a func-
tion which had been constitutionally granted to Congress. Besides this
fundamental statement of policy, Youngstown is probably most note-
worthy for the theory of implied presidential power expressed in the
concurring opinion of Justice Jackson.
Justice Jackson stated that, although the President has rather
broad powers, such powers are constrained by the action-or inac-
tion-of Congress. He reasoned that presidential power is at its zenith
when in accord with express congressional authorization and at its na-
dir when in opposition to the will of Congress. 138 Justice Jackson con-
cluded that President Truman simply did not have the necessary
132. President Truman feared that labor disputes would shut down the operation of the na-
tion's steel mills and thereby hinder the war effort in Korea. He therefore promulgated Executive
Order No. 10340 which authorized governmental seizure and operation of the mills. Id. at 583.
133. Id at 588.
134. Id at 586. The legislation in question was the Taft-Hartley Act (The National Labor
Relations Act of 1947). 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The Act dealt with the process of collective bargain-
ing and although the Act did allow for temporary injunctions to forestall impulsive actions by
labor or management, the legislation did not provide for seizure of private property. 343 U.S. at
586.
135. The Court was split 6-3 with Justice Black delivering the opinion of the Court. However,
five Justices-Justices Jackson, Douglas, Frankfurter, Burton and Clark-each wrote a separate
concurring opinion.
136. The view that the President can exercise nonenumerated powers in an emergency can be
attributed to the three dissenting Justices-Justices Vinson, Reed and Minton-as well as to the
concurring opinions of Justices Jackson, Frankfurter and Clark.
137. The dissent argued that the inherent powers of the President would allow the seizure. 343
U.S. at 700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
138. id at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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independent authority to seize the mills, because Congress was silent
concerning the authorization of executive seizure.'
39
Justice Jackson applied the same analysis to explain United States
v. Curtiss- Wright Corp. ,140 a previous Supreme Court decision involv-
ing the extent of executive power. In Curtiss- Wright, the Court upheld
an executive proclamation, issued pursuant to express congressional
authorization, which prohibited the shipment of weapons to the Chaco
region of South America.' 4' Justice Jackson reasoned that the princi-
pal distinction between Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright was that Presi-
dent Roosevelt had been acting pursuant to express congressional
authority in the Curtiss-Wright dispute, while President Truman was
acting without congressional authorization in the seizure at issue in
Youngstown. t42 However, the Court in Curtiss- Wright does not appear
to have based its decision on the congressional authorization but, rather
on the role of the President as Chief Executive, which vests him with
inherent power in foreign affairs greater than those powers he would
normally enjoy over domestic policies.
43
The Court in Curtiss-Wright asserted:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of a legisla-
tive power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations-a power which
does not require . . . an act of Congress .... 144
Furthermore, the Curtiss- Wright Court held that federal power in for-
eign affairs, unlike domestic affairs, does not consist of enumerated
powers but, rather, incorporates the general authority inherent in na-
tional sovereignty.
45
This view of federal executive power in international affairs was
139. Id at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson reasoned that the silence of Congress
represented an intermediate level of executive authority. The President was neither acting against
the express will of Congress nor in accordance with express delegation. Because the Court could
not infer congressional acquiescence through its silence, the President had to justify his actions
through authority independent of legislative delegation.
140. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
141. Id at 329. The Joint Resolution, 48 Stat. 811 (1934), gave the President discretion to
prohibit the sale of arms to the countries engaged in the dispute in the Chaco region of South
America if he believed that such cessation of arms sales would aid in the reestablishment of peace.
142. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952).
143. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
144. Id at 319-20.
145. Id at 318. The Court reasoned that the general authority to conduct foreign policy,
including making war, concluding peace, making treaties and maintaining diplomatic relations,
was inherent in sovereignty. Therefore these powers would be vested in the federal government
even absent a constitutional grant of authority, as a necessary concomitant of nationhood. Id.
The Court further determined that any inherent sovereign authority in foreign affairs which is not
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later reaffirmed in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp. ,146 in which the Supreme Court cited the plenary ex-
ecutive power over foreign policy as the basis for its refusal to examine
an executive order granting an overseas air route. 147 The Court rea-
soned that the President exercised not only the commerce authority del-
egated to him by Congress, but his independent foreign affairs power as
well. Faced with this "plenary authority," the Supreme Court applied
the political question doctrine and declined to review the executive ac-
tion. 
48
Therefore, despite the confusion inherent in the Youngstown deci-
sion and the soundness of Justice Jackson's analysis, the President does
appear to possess inherent powers which are neither expressly deline-
ated in the Constitution nor delegated by Congress and that this inher-
ent authority is greater in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. At
the same time, however, it appears that congressional authorization, or
the lack thereof, is relevant in the determination of the limits of presi-
dential authority. It is with the awareness of the general limitation of
executive authority, and of the expanded executive authority in foreign
policy, that the validity of the regulation in Narenji should be analyzed.
ANALYSIS
In analyzing Narenji v. Civiletti, three basic issues must be con-
sidered: whether the regulation is inherently unconstitutional, i e.,
whether its promulgation is within the constitutional authority of the
United States government; whether, if the regulation is not facially
void, it is within the authority of either the Attorney General or the
President to promulgate such a regulation; and, whether the court uti-
lized the proper standard of review in determining the validity of the
regulation.
Despite the assertion by Judge MacKinnon in Narenji that the reg-
ulation is not discriminatory because it provides for the deportation of
aliens deportable prior to its promulgation, 49 regulation 214.5 must be
considered discriminatory against a class of aliens. First, the regulation
classifies aliens by nationality, imposing a particular duty on Iranian
nationals not shared by aliens generally. Second, by imposing the duty
otherwise provided in the Constitution would be vested in the Executive as the head of State. Id
at 319-20.
146. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
147. Id at 114.
148. Id at 111.
149. 617 F.2d at 750 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
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to report on Iranians and making failure to report a deportable offense,
the Executive has, in effect, established a deportable offense applicable
exclusively to Iranians. Nevertheless, despite the determination that
the regulation is discriminatory, the regulation is probably not violative
of the fifth amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached
this conclusion, but did so in a rather unconvincing manner. The court
in Narenji stated that "[d]istinctions on the basis of nationality may be
drawn. . . by the Congress or the Executive,"' 50 citing Saxbe v. Bus-
los, 51 Mathews v. Diaz152 and Fiallo v. Bell' 5 3 as direct authority.
While these cases do concern the validity of alienage classifications, not
one of them deals with, or even mentions, classifications based on na-
tionality. Therefore, this authority does not directly support the propo-
sition for which it is cited. Despite the failure of the court to support its
holding adequately, case law does indicate that federal classifications
among aliens by national origin have been sustained. 
54
Although in some cases the Supreme Court has struck down stat-
utes which purported to regulate aliens, but which actually discrimi-
nated against them by reason of national origin, 55 these decisions are
based on the application of strict judicial scrutiny, a judicial test which
has been applied to alien discrimination by states but not by the federal
government. 156 In fact, the Court does not appear to have struck down
a single federal regulation dealing with the classification of aliens, al-
though many of these regulations would be constitutional violations if
applied to citizens. 157 Therefore, the regulation in question would
probably be included in the federal plenary power over aliens, and thus
not be violative of the equal protection clause, even though it contains
a classification based on national origin.
58
The next issue to be considered is whether the regulation chal-
lenged by Narenji was promulgated with requisite authority. First, the
authority exercised by the Attorney General must be questioned. In
150. Id at 747.
151. 419 U.S. 65 (1974).
152. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
153. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
154. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
156. See notes 95-107 supra and accompanying text.
157. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976); Rosberg, supra note 64, at 316-36.
158. Classifications by national origin are clearly suspect and are subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
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Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 1 5 9 the Supreme Court held that the Civil
Service Commission is not vested with the authority to exclude aliens
from the competitive civil service and, therefore, found such a prohibi-
tion to be unconstitutional. 60 The Court held that such delegation had
not been effectuated through the legislation charging the Commission
and implied that the outcome might have been different if there had
been an explicit command from either Congress or the President.'
61 If
Attorney General Civiletti had been empowered exclusively by the
grant of authority in the immigration legislation, the regulation may
have been struck down even if otherwise valid, because the statute does
not authorize the Attorney General to enforce immigration laws
through nationality-based classifications. However, in the instant situ-
ation, the Attorney General promulgated regulation 214.5 in response
to direct orders from President Carter to identify and deport all Iranian
students in the United States who were currently out of status.
62
Therefore, the Attorney General was merely the instrumentality of the
President, and it could be argued that the President had delegated all
his authority regarding aliens to Mr. Civiletti. Thus, the issue becomes
that of whether the President himself possessed the requisite authority
to promulgate the regulation.
The Narenji court analyzed the situation as if the powers of Con-
gress and those of the President were virtually identical in the area of
immigration. 63 Some earlier cases certainly have implied a similar
conclusion. 64 Nevertheless, such findings must be considered little
more than dicta. In those cases, the Supreme Court was reviewing ei-
ther a specific act of Congress which classified aliens' 65 or executive
actions taken under fairly specific congressional acts.' 66 For example,
in Mathews v. Diaz, 67 the exclusion of a class of aliens from Medicare
benefits was upheld based on an explicit congressional enactment.' 68
Similarly, in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,169 the Court was dealing with
159. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
160. Id. at 115-16.
161. d. at 116.
162. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (D.D.C. 1979).
163. 617 F.2d at 747.
164. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976).
165. Eg., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Act of Congress delimiting Medicare benefits
in regard to aliens).
166. E.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Congressional delegation to the Secre-
tary of State, granting him the discretion to issue visas to aliens with Communist affiliations).
167. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o) (1976).
169. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
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the enforcement of a statute which declared alien membership in the
Communist Party to be a deportable offense.'
70
The only express constitutional grant of authority regarding immi-
gration is a grant to Congress. While the Constitution is silent regard-
ing the specific area of immigration, the Constitution grants Congress
the power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization."' 7' The Presi-
dent's authority, then, derives from congressional delegation and from
the implied authority stemming from his foreign affairs and national
executive powers.' 72 Through congressional delegation, the Executive
has the authority to enforce immigration laws which Congress estab-
lishes. 173 The Executive certainly has the right and the authority to
deport Iranians who are out of status. 174 However, whether the Execu-
tive may order only one class of aliens to report and to establish a spe-
cific deportable offense are issues different from the general authority
of the Executive to deport aliens out of status. 75
The government relied on United States ex re. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 76 in arguing that the delegation by Congress to the Executive
includes the right to promulgate the classification at issue in Narenji.
In Knauff, the Court sanctioned the actions of the Attorney General
when he denied entry of an alien war bride 177 deemed to be a security
risk by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 78 The Attorney
General refused her admittance because her entry would be prejudicial
to the national interest.' 79 In upholding the actions of the executive
branch, the Supreme Court accepted the validity of a congressional del-
egation which provided that "the President might, upon finding that
the interests of the United States required it, impose additional restric-
tions and prohibitions on the entry into and departure of persons from
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
172. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976).
174. Id.
175. The regulation provides that failure to comply would be grounds for immediate deporta-
tion proceedings which, in effect, establishes a deportable offense. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5(b) (1980).
176. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
177. A war bride is a colloquial expression referring to a foreign woman who marries a ser-
viceman while the latter is stationed overseas. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 2575 (17th ed. 1976).
178. 338 U.S. at 539-40.
179. Id. at 540. The Court did not explain the reasons for the determination by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service and the Attorney General that the entry of Mrs. Knauff would be
prejudicial to the United States. Indeed, Mrs. Knauff appears to have been a model war bride.
She fled Germany after Hitler came to power. She went to England in 1939 where she served in
the Royal Air Force, and in 1946 she became a civilian employee of the United States War De-
partment in Germany where her work was described as very good and excellent. Id at 539.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the United States during the national emergency proclaimed May 27,
1941."180 After this delegation, the President authorized the promulga-
tion of regulations by both the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General that "no alien should be permitted to enter the United States if
it were found that such entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States."181
The district court in Narenji disagreed with the government's con-
tention. Relying on Kent v. Dulles, 82 the court held that the delegation
by Congress to the Executive did not include the power to classify
aliens by nationality. 83 In Kent, the Secretary of State refused to issue
a passport to alleged Communists who refused to file affidavits con-
cerning their political philosophies. 8 4 The Supreme Court invalidated
the actions of the Secretary of State, reasoning that, although the dele-
gation by Congress to the Executive 8 5 provided the Secretary of State
with broad discretion regarding the issuance of passports, the Execu-
tive's power did not allow him to withhold passports for "any substan-
tive reason."'' 86 The Court found that the broad power of the Secretary
of State, which had long been described as discretionary, should be
construed strictly and that the Secretary should be allowed to withhold
a passport only when the applicant is not a citizen of or a person owing
allegiance to the United States or is engaging in criminal or unlawful
conduct. 
8 7
Clearly neither Knauff nor Kent are directly apposite to Narenfi.
While Knauff may be closer factually-because it deals with the au-
thority of the Executive over aliens-Kent may be closer legally, due to
similarity in the basic congressional delegation of authority. Certainly
the delegation involved in Knauff is extremely broad and allows the
Executive apparently limitless discretion in determining the admissibil-
ity of aliens into the United States. Such broad delegation, however, is
not apparent in the current immigration statute which specifically
grants executive power only to enforce the provisions of the statute.' 88
If the Executive were able to rely only on the general delegation of
authority contained in the immigration statutes, inferring the authority
180. Id at 540. The statute at issue was 55 Stat. 252 (1941).
181. Proclamation No. 2523 (Nov. 14, 1941), 55 Stat. 1696 (1941).
182. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
183. 481 F. Supp. at 1144-45.
184. 357 U.S. at 117-18. The Secretary of State promulgated 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1950) under
which the plaintiffs were denied passports.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
186. 357 U.S. at 129.
187. Id at 130.
188. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1976).
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to classify aliens by national origin would be difficult. There is no rea-
son to believe that classification based on national origin is necessary
for the Attorney General to carry out his function in the field of immi-
gration. 8 9 In Narenji, however, the delegated authority of the Presi-
dent may be strengthened by an extremely obscure statute, enacted in
1868,190 which actually has nothing whatsoever to do with immigrants
or aliens.
This statute authorizes the President to demand the release of
American citizens who are unjustly deprived of liberty by a foreign
government and to "use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as
he might think necessary and proper to obtain their release."' 9' To
date, the statute has been used infrequently and apparently only as
authority to establish the duty of the Executive to effectuate the release
of Americans held captive abroad. As such, it has been employed by
Americans who, having been held captive, were suing the government,
claiming that the latter had not made sufficient efforts to obtain their
freedom. '
92
Because the statute has yet to be interpreted judicially as a delega-
tion of any specific authority to the Executive, 93 its effect is unclear. It
certainly appears to grant the President great discretion in attempting
to effectuate the release of captive American citizens abroad, and, ac-
cording to the analysis of Justice Jackson in Youngstown,' 94 the delega-
tion of congressional authority in a particular area should enhance the
executive authority to act. Nevertheless, any actual grant of authority
is extremely vague and may not include the right to affect aliens in this
country.
The statute was most certainly intended to enhance the President's
authority in dealing diplomatically with foreign countries and did not
envision encompassing presidential actions which would affect persons
in the United States. Furthermore, the statute may actually be inter-
189. The court of appeals in Narenji found classification based on national origin to be rea-
sonably related to the duties of the Attorney General in the immigration field. 617 F.2d at 748.
Nevertheless, the court did not explain the basis for its finding. Because the duty of the Attorney
General in immigration matters is the enforcement of the congressional statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1103
(1976), the holding in Narenji implies that the Attorney General has the power to determine that
aliens of a particular national origin are more likely to violate the statutes, or that classification by
nationality is required for identifying offending parties.
190. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
191. Id
192. See, e.g., Redpath v. Kissinger, 415 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Tex.), aft'd, 545 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1976).
193. The statute was mentioned by Judge MacKinnon in his statement opposing the granting
of a rehearing en banc. 617 F.2d at 753.
194. See notes 138-42 supra and accompanying text.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
preted as a limitation of executive actions, prohibiting such conduct
that would amount to "acts of war."' 95 While such a proscription
would not affect the legality of the actions of the President in Narenji, it
may have implications in regard to other actions taken 96 or contem-
plated 97 by the United States government.
If the President does not have sufficient authority to promulgate
regulation 214.5 through legislative delegation, he must rely on implied
executive authority to justify his actions. President Carter did declare a
state of national emergency 98 because of the Iranian crisis, and such a
state of emergency does increase the powers of the Executive. 199 Nev-
ertheless, such a precedent is not sufficient for the Executive to assume
a power constitutionally delegated to Congress. 200 Instead, the Presi-
dent must vindicate his authority through his extensive foreign affairs
powers20' which have been held to be legitimate elements of authority
in immigration actions.
20 2
In this regard, the President may be on fairly strong ground le-
gally. Although immigration policy and the treatment of aliens in this
country have been characterized as matters affecting foreign policy,
Narenji involves considerably more foreign policy implications than, in
general, do most immigration decisions. In essence, the action ordered
by President Carter and implemented by Attorney General Civiletti
must be considered to be one of foreign policy. The promulgation of
regulation 214.5 was designed to effectuate specific foreign policy
objectives, either to obtain release of the captives, or at least to evi-
dence the resolve of the United States government in the crisis. The
regulation was not intended to effectuate an immigration policy. As
such, the regulation does not actually intrude into immigration areas
which belong to Congress, and the President may utilize the implied
powers of the Executive in foreign policy.20 3 Therefore, the President
195. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
196. Landing troops in Iran, even in an attempt to rescue the Americans held captive, as was
the case in the unsuccessful rescue mission of April 25, 1980, may conceivably be considered an
act of war. Similarly, the economic measures taken by the United States may be considered an act
of war if performed with the intent of destabilizing or toppling the government of Iran.
197. Other nondiplomatic measures contemplated by the United States including a naval
blockade, air strike or limited invasion are generally considered to be acts of war and may be
limited by the application of § 1732.
198. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. § 457 (1980). The order was issued on November 14,
1979.
199. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
200. Id
201. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
202. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976).
203. See notes 143-48 supra and accompanying text.
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may have effective authority to promulgate regulation 214.5 under his
foreign policy powers, even if the authority delegated by Congress were
inadequate.
Finally, it is appropriate to discuss the standard of review under
which the District of Columbia Circuit adjudicated Narenji. Obvi-
ously, the Narenji court employed an extremely lenient standard of ju-
dicial scrutiny. The court stated that any federal classification of aliens
would be sustained unless "wholly irrational" 2° 4 and, in effect, applied
the political question doctrine, declining to review the rationality of the
regulation. 2
05
Clearly, the dissenting judges in the denial for rehearing believed
that the standard of review utilized by the court in Narenji was inade-
quate:
It may be that the President, in these troubled days, has the power to
decide that our deep aversion to selective law enforcement against a
group solely on the basis of their country of origin must give way to
some other imperative. . . . Nevertheless, the question requires
close scrutiny, and our answer must reflect careful consideration of
"fine, and often difficult, questions of values. '
'2°6
The above quotation suggests that the political question doctrine must
yield to the protection of constitutional rights, that questions of equal
protection must be adjudicated with a greater degree of judicial scru-
tiny than that shown by the Narenji court. This interpretation can be
supported logically. The equal protection mandated by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments is a limitation on the powers of the federal and
state governments, respectively. The government is constitutionally
precluded from enacting laws or regulations which are violations of
equal protection. The governmental power to establish unconstitu-
tional regulations simply does not exist. The political question doctrine
cannot be invoked until the basis of governmental authority has been
established because the doctrine cannot confer power on a political
branch of government which is not authorized by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has not employed the political question doc-
trine to avoid considering the power of a branch of government. In
fact, the Court has shown a willingness to decide whether the actions of
one branch have infringed on another. 20 7 It is inappropriate for courts
204. 617 F.2d at 747.
205. Id at 748.
206. Id. at 754-55 (Wright, C.J., Robinson, J., Wald, J., and Mikva, J., setting forth their
reasons to rehear the case en banc) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
207. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in grant of certio-
rari), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707
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to employ the political question doctrine to avoid determining whether
a branch of government has exceeded its constitutional authority.
208
Because the equal protection clause and the separation of powers doc-
trine act as limitations on the powers of the branches of government, it
may be inappropriate for courts to avoid these issues because of the
political nature of the decisions.
The Narenji court, however, deferred to the authority of the Exec-
utive before it adequately explained the basis of that authority. If the
executive authority had been established, the facts of Narenji may indi-
cate the efficacy of applying the political question doctrine. The fourth
requisite of the doctrine is an "unusual need for the unquestioned ad-
herence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question." 20 9 The international situation and the
negotiations by the Executive to secure the release of the Americans
held captive fulfill this requirement. A judicial statement nullifying the
executive action would have certainly embarrassed President Carter
and may have undercut his negotiating position.
CONCLUSION
The result in Narenji is certainly defensible. The Supreme Court
has determined that the federal power over aliens is extremely broad.
Nevertheless, Narenji is disquieting, not so much for its result as for the
manner in which the result was reached. Through its unquestioning
deference to the actions of the Executive and its failure to explain the
basis for its decision, the District of Columbia Circuit implied that any
executive action regarding aliens must be accorded similar deference.
A preferable mode of analysis would have been for the court to
explain first the basis of authority of the Executive in this situation and
then specifically apply the political question doctrine because of the
need not to embarrass the President during delicate international nego-
tiations. Such a holding would have certainly limited the precedential
effect of Narenji and left open the question of the general validity of
executive regulation of aliens based on nationality classifications.
In holding that executive regulation of aliens must be sustained
unless "wholly irrational" and then employing the minimum rational-
(1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676-78 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).
208. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
209. See note 118 supra.
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ity test in upholding a classification as invidious as one based on na-
tionality, the Narenji court indicates that virtually any classification
would be sustained. While the courts should not interfere in political
decisions, if the courts cannot exert a meaningful review of federal ac-
tions, potentially the rights of aliens in the United States may be
abused. Eventually, those rights may be protected by little more than
executive discretion.
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